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How do we decide whether to use external artifacts and reminders to remember delayed 
intentions, versus relying on unaided memory? Experiment 1 (N=400) showed that 
participants’ choice to forgo reminders in an experimental task was independently 
predicted by subjective confidence and objective ability, even when the two measures 
were themselves uncorrelated. Use of reminders improved performance, explaining 
significant variance in intention fulfilment even after controlling for unaided ability. 
Experiment 2 (N=303) additionally investigated a pair of unrelated perceptual 
discrimination tasks, where the confidence and sensitivity of metacognitive judgments 
was decorrelated from objective performance using a staircase procedure. Participants 
with lower confidence in their perceptual judgments set more reminders in the delayed-
intention task, even though confidence was unrelated to objective accuracy. However, 
memory confidence was a better predictor of reminder setting. Thus, propensity to set 
reminders was independently influenced by a) domain-general metacognitive confidence; 
b) task-specific confidence; and c) objective ability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Suppose you have decided to make a phone call at 2pm tomorrow. To ensure that you 
do so, you might make a note in a diary, or leave a reminder taped to a noticeable place. 
If you have a smartphone or digital watch, you might set an alarm for the appropriate 
time. These are all ways of ‘offloading’ intentions into the external environment. 
Alternatively, you might simply rely on your unaided memory. How will you decide 
which strategy to use?  
 
The question of how we decide whether or not to offload intentions is of both practical 
and theoretical significance. It is of practical significance because external artifacts and 
reminders can be effective tools for remembering delayed intentions (Allen, 2002; Henry, 
Rendell, Phillips, Dunlop, & Kliegel, 2012; Heylighen & Vidal, 2008; Maylor, 1990). If we 
are to understand how intentions are fulfilled in everyday life it is therefore important to 
understand how we decide whether or not to set reminders, and what interventions 
might affect these decisions. This is likely to become increasingly important as 
smartphones and wearable technologies become more commonplace (Migo et al., 2014; 
Svoboda, Rowe, & Murphy, 2012). It also has practical relevance to compensation for 
memory difficulties in the context of ageing, disease, and brain injury (Fish, Wilson, & 
Manly, 2010; Thöne-Otto & Walther, 2008; Wilson, Emslie, Quirk, & Evans, 2001). 
 
On a theoretical level, this question is important particularly due to its relationship with 
metacognition, i.e. the ability to represent and reason about our own mental states and 
processes (Metcalfe, 1996). In deciding whether or not to offload an intention, it seems 
plausible that we reflect on the difficulty of its fulfillment, and our unaided ability, before 
deciding whether to use external support. This assumption will be investigated 
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empirically below. Thus, investigating participants’ decisions whether or not to offload 
intentions can help us to understand the relationship between metacognition, memory 
ability, and strategy use (Kvavilashvili & Ford, 2014; Meeks, Hicks, & Marsh, 2007; 
Meier, von Wartburg, Matter, Rothen, & Reber, 2011; Metcalfe, 2009; Rummel & Meiser, 
2013; Schnitzspahn, Zeintl, Jäger, & Kliegel, 2011). While metacognition is often 
assumed to be an important factor for triggering strategic use of reminders for 
prospective memory (e.g. Arango-Muñoz, 2013; Knight, Harnett, & Titov, 2005; Phillips, 
Henry, & Martin, 2008), this assumption has received little empirical attention, due to the 
lack of experimental paradigms that allow participants’ use of reminders to be 
systematically investigated. 
 
Experimental paradigms for investigating prospective memory vary on a number of 
characteristics (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). One dimension on which they vary is the 
way in which intentions are cued. In event-based tasks an intended behavior is cued 
when we notice a relevant stimulus (as in remembering to post a letter when we notice a 
mailbox). In time-based tasks an intended behavior is cued at a particular moment (as in 
remembering to attend a meeting at the appropriate time). Activity-based tasks, where an 
intention is triggered by the completion of a prior activity, are also possible. Another 
dimension on which paradigms vary is the delay between encoding an intention and 
acting on it.  Outside the laboratory this can range from periods of seconds (e.g. going to 
the staff room to pick up one’s mail, and intending to collect a milk bottle from the 
fridge on one’s way back), to days, weeks, or longer (e.g. intending to attend a meeting 
scheduled months in advance). For practical reasons, laboratory studies typically use a 
seconds-to-minutes timeframe. A third dimension, at least in event-based tasks, is the 
salience of the cue to which an intention is attached; this relates to the distinction made 
by some theorists between “focal” and “non-focal” cues (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). 
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Despite these variations in experimental paradigms, one characteristic shared by virtually 
all studies is that participants are prevented from creating external reminders. This is in 
sharp contrast to everyday life, in which such strategies are commonplace. 
 
In order to examine cognitive processes involved in setting external reminders, Gilbert 
(in press) investigated a web-based “intention offloading” task, in which participants 
fulfilled an intention on each trial, after a brief filled delay (see also Landsiedel & Gilbert, 
2015, for a neuroimaging investigation of this task). On each trial, participants 
sequentially removed a set of numbered circles from a box, by dragging each circle in 
turn to the bottom edge (Figure 1). They were instructed to remove target circles by 
dragging them to an alternative edge (e.g. “please drag 7 to the top instead”). Participants 
were given the option of setting an external reminder, by placing the target circles next to 
the intended edge at the start of the trial. When they did this, the intention was offloaded 
in the sense that it was now directly cued by the location of the target circle. 
Consequently, there was no need to mentally rehearse the intended behavior. An 
everyday analogy might be leaving an object in a noticeable position so that it cues an 
intended behavior, for example leaving something by the front door so that we 
remember to bring it with us when leaving the house. 
 
Gilbert (in press) found that accuracy on this task predicted fulfillment of a real-world 
intention of visiting a specified weblink up to 7 days later to receive a small bonus 
payment, with greater predictive validity than more traditional time- and event-based 
prospective memory tasks. Thus, the task had significant external validity as a measure of 
fulfillment of delayed intentions (albeit with a weak effect size). Furthermore, when this 
task was matched in accuracy with a control task that did not permit external reminders 
but was otherwise identical, only the version permitting external reminders significantly 
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predicted real-world behavior. Investigating performance of the intention-offloading task 
revealed three main findings. 1) Intention offloading promoted intention fulfillment: 
permitting this strategy boosted performance, and participants who set more reminders 
fulfilled more intentions. 2) Participants were more likely to offload intentions when they 
had three targets to remember rather than one. Thus, the decision to offload intentions 
was influenced by memory load. 3) Participants were more likely to offload intentions 
when they encountered an interruption in the ongoing task. Thus, the decision to offload 
intentions was also influenced by the ongoing task in which the memory load was 
embedded. The latter two findings show that participants offload intentions adaptively 
based on the difficulty of the task, seeing as a higher memory load and the presence of 
interruption both reduced intention fulfillment in a matched version of the task that 
disallowed intention offloading. 
 
The results outlined above show that task-specific factors influenced participants’ 
decisions whether to set reminders. However, even when the task was held constant, 
there was considerable variation between participants in this behavior. The present study 
aims to explore the factors that might underlie such individual differences in intention 
offloading. Why do some participants tend to rely on unaided memory, while others are 
more likely to set reminders? Note that the experimental paradigm under investigation 
involves intentions delayed for brief periods on the order of 5-15 seconds. Of course, 
intentions in everyday life operate over a variety of timescales, from brief interruptions 
(e.g. delaying a pending task for a few seconds, during periods of high workload) to 
hours, days, or longer. Although Gilbert (in press) found that the present intention-
offloading task predicted fulfillment of real-world intentions up to one week later, it is 
not claimed in the present article that the processes involved in fulfilling delayed 
intentions over such different time periods necessarily overlap. Rather, it is hoped that 
	   7	  
studying the ways in which participants offload briefly-delayed intentions might serve as 
a useful first step to understanding metacognitive processes related to the use of 
reminders over a longer timescale. 
 
2. Experiment 1 
 
Participants performed the intention-offloading task described above in two phases. In 
phase one, they performed the unaided task, without being able to set reminders. 
Subsequently, in phase two, they were permitted to offload intentions, and their use of 
reminders was investigated. Before and after each phase, participants provided a 
subjective rating of how well they expected to perform, or how well they thought they 
had performed.  This allowed participants’ use of reminders to be related to a) objective 
performance measures and b) metacognitive judgments of their own ability.  
 
Two hypotheses might be contrasted here. On the one hand, participants who assess 
their unaided ability to be poor, or those who do indeed perform poorly in the first phase 
of the task, might subsequently set reminders as a compensatory strategy. In this case, 
objective and/or subjective performance measures in phase one should correlate negatively 
with reminder setting in phase two. On the other hand, it might be that the very 
participants who already perform well on the task and/or have high confidence in their 
performance will be the ones who subsequently make the most use of reminders. This 
would be a ‘rich get richer’ scenario. It might occur because the most able participants 
would also have the metacognitive insight to realize the utility of an externalizing 
strategy, and hence make use of it. Alternatively, participants who are highly motivated to 
perform well, which should boost performance in phase one, might also make the most 
use of intention offloading in phase two. These hypotheses predict a positive relationship 
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between objective and/or subjective performance measures in phase one and 
externalizing behavior in phase two. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.1 Methods 
 
2.1.1 Experiment 1a 
 
The experiment followed a similar procedure to Gilbert (in press). Participants were 
recruited from the Amazon Mechanical Turk website (http://www.mturk.com), an 
online marketplace in which participants receive payments for completion of web-based 
tasks (Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). Ethical approval was received from the 
UCL Research Ethics Committee and informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. As in the earlier study by Gilbert (in press), participation was restricted to 
volunteers living in the USA, to reduce heterogeneity; furthermore, participants who had 
taken part in the earlier studies reported by Gilbert (in press) were blocked to ensure a 
fresh sample of participants. 
 
Participants completed the task via their computer’s web browser. On each trial, ten 
yellow circles numbered 1-10 were positioned randomly within a box (Figure 1). 
Participants were instructed to drag the circles in turn (1, 2, 3 etc.) to the bottom of the 
box, using their computer mouse. When a circle was dragged to the bottom of the box it 
disappeared, leaving the other circles on the screen. After the 10th circle had disappeared, 
the screen was cleared and the next trial began. For a demonstration, please visit 
“http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sam-gilbert/demos/circleDemo.html”. 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Alongside this ongoing task, participants were provided with a delayed intention on each 
trial: they were instructed to remove one circle by dragging it to a specific alternative 
location (i.e. left, right, or top) when it was reached in the sequence. Thus, they formed 
delayed intentions to perform particular actions when they encountered pre-specified 
cues, although they could produce a standard ongoing response (i.e. dragging the circle to 
the bottom of the box) if they forgot. However, if they attempted to drag a target circle 
to an incorrect target location (left, top, or right), or if they attempted to drag a nontarget 
circle to any of these locations, it remained on the screen, allowing participants to realize 
that they had made a mistake. 
 
In some conditions intention offloading was permitted, meaning that participants could 
drag the target circle toward its intended location at the beginning of the trial. By placing 
a circle next to the instructed edge, participants created a perceptual trigger that 
reminded them to remove that circle by dragging it to the left, right, or top of the box, 
instead of the bottom. This reminder then cued the appropriate behavior when the target 
circle was reached in the sequence. The externalizing proportion was defined as the 
proportion of target circles for which participants set an external reminder in this way 
(calculated in an identical manner to Gilbert, in press; accuracy measures were also 
calculated in an identical manner to the earlier study). In other conditions, intention 
offloading was not allowed. This was achieved by fixing the position of the circles on the 
screen so only the upcoming circle in the sequence could ever by dragged (i.e. circle 2 
could only be moved after circle 1 had been dragged to the bottom of the screen, circle 3 
could only be moved after circle 2 had been removed, etc). 
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The sequence of events for each participant, following their provision of consent, was as 
follows: 
 
A) Phase 1 prediction: Following two practice trials of the experimental task, participants 
were told that the experiment was about to start and asked to provide a prediction of 
what percentage of targets they thought they would drag to the instructed locations. 
They provided this prediction by dragging a circle along a slider, which allowed them to 
select any value between 0% and 100%. The slider was initially placed at the 50% mark, 
and participants were only allowed to proceed to the next part of the task after they had 
clicked the circle to provide a response. 
 
B) Phase 1: Participants performed 10 trials of the experimental task. 
 
C) Phase 1 postdiction: Participants were then asked to report what percentage of target 
circles they thought they had correctly dragged to the instructed location, using the same 
slider as in part A.  
 
D) Offloading instructions and practice: Participants were then informed of the intention 
offloading strategy. They were told that this was an optional strategy that they could use 
if they wished, but it was up to them whether to use it. They then performed two 
practice trials with offloading permitted. 
 
E) Phase 2 prediction: Participants provided a performance prediction for phase 2, using 
the same slider as in part A. 
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F) Phase 2: Participants performed 10 trials of the experimental task, with offloading 
permitted. 
 
G) Phase 2 postdiction: Participants reported their performance in phase 2, using the same 
slider as in part A. 
 
2.1.2 Experiment 1b 
 
An additional sample of participants was recruited who performed a more difficult 
version of the task. On each experimental trial, participants were instructed to drag three 
targets to alternative locations instead of one. Furthermore, participants additionally 
received a distracting arithmetic question during each trial, as in the ‘Interruption’ 
condition of Gilbert (in press; Experiment 1). This occurred immediately after dragging 
one of the nontarget circles to the bottom of the box, at a position in the sequence 
randomly selected between the first circle and the first target. In this experiment, 
participants performed three initial practice trials before commencing the experimental 
trials, rather than two. Apart from these changes, the procedure of Experiment 1b was 
identical to Experiment 1a. 
 
2.2 Participants 
200 participants were recruited in Experiment 1a (mean age 32, range 18-66, 95 male) 
and a further 200 participants in Experiment 1b. 5 participants were replaced in 
Experiment 1b due to arithmetic-verification accuracy below 80% (final sample: mean 
age 33, range 18-65, 80 male). Participation took approximately 20 minutes, for which 
participants were paid $2. 
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2.3 Results 
 
In Experiment 1a the mean retention interval (i.e. time from the start of each trial until 
the first target circle was reached in the sequence) was 8.8s in phase 1 and 9.3s in phase 
2. The equivalent figures for Experiment 1b were 11.0s and 14.0s respectively. Mean 
arithmetic-verification accuracy in Experiment 1b was 99%. Table 1 lists the mean 
prediction and postdiction judgments for Experiments 1a and 1b, alongside measures of 
objective performance and externalizing proportion. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In both experiments, predictions were more pessimistic than postdictions (F(1,199) > 42, 
p < 10-10, η2>.19) and phase 2 ratings were higher than phase 1 ratings (F(1,199) > 43, p 
< 10-9, η2>.18). These two factors interacted significantly in Experiment 1a (F(1,199) = 
61, p < 10-12, η2=.24) and marginally significantly in Experiment 1b (F(1,199) = 3.3, p = 
.07, η2=.016). In Experiment 1b, phase 2 objective accuracy, when intention offloading 
was permitted, was higher than phase 1 (F(1,199) = 56, p < 10-12, η2=.24). There was no 
significant difference in Experiment 1a (F < 1; Experiment x Phase interaction: F(1,398) 
= 26, p < 10-7, η2=.06). Thus, availability of the intention offloading strategy improved 
performance in Experiment 1b but not Experiment 1a (where unaided performance in 
phase 1 was already near ceiling). Participants were significantly more likely to set 
reminders in Experiment 1b than Experiment 1a (t(391.8) = 7.3, p < 10-12, d = .74). In 
order to evaluate their interrelations, the correlations between these measures are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
	   13	  
 
In both experiments, the four subjective judgments were positively correlated with each 
other. Measures of objective performance in the two phases were positively correlated 
with all four subjective judgments in Experiment 1b, with phase 1 accuracy most strongly 
correlated with phase 1 postdiction, and phase 2 accuracy with phase 2 postdiction. A 
more complex pattern was evident in Experiment 1a. In this experiment, the two 
postdiction judgments were positively correlated with objective performance in the 
relevant phase of the task. Participants were therefore able to retrospectively evaluate 
their task performance with some degree of accuracy. However, predictions in the two 
phases were uncorrelated with subsequent objective performance (phase 1: r = -.007; 
phase 2: r = -.020). Thus, in Experiment 1a participants were able to evaluate their recent 
performance, but not to predict forthcoming accuracy. Moreover, their retrospective 
judgments of phase 1 performance significantly predicted subsequent accuracy in phase 
2, even though their actual predictions for phase 2 did not. This suggests that in this 
experiment, with a very simple task, participants had little or no prospective insight into 
their likelihood of making errors, whereas they were able to detect errors after they were 
committed, which reliably predicted future errors. 
 
Turning now to the externalizing proportion (i.e. propensity to set reminders), the simple 
correlations between this measure and the other measures may be difficult to interpret, 
due to multiple causal pathways that need to be disentangled. For example, setting 
reminders in phase 2 might be expected to improve performance, leading to a positive 
correlation between externalizing proportion and phase 2 accuracy. On the other hand, if 
reminders are most likely to be set by participants with poor ability and do not fully 
compensate for this, then a higher externalizing proportion might be associated with 
poorer phase 2 performance. Thus, two opposing effects might cancel out in the simple 
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correlation between externalizing proportion and phase 2 performance. Another example 
would be that the different prediction and postdiction ratings may consist of various 
components, such as a general motivation to perform well and a general sense of 
metacognitive confidence, a preference for using one part of the rating scale, and 
metacognitive evaluations that apply in a task-specific manner to the individual ratings. 
These effects can be distinguished using a multiple regression approach. Thus, 
considering the strict temporal ordering of the measures collected in these experiments, a 
path analysis was conducted to investigate their multiple possible relationships (Figure 2). 
This can be seen as a form of structural equation modeling in which every variable is a 
directly observed measure (Garson, 2012). In order to calculate the path weights in this 
model, a linear regression is calculated for each measure in turn, including all antecedent 
measures as predictors. Path weights reflect standardized betas and significance testing 
reflects the significance of each predictor in the relevant linear regression. In other 
words, a significant path weight from an antecedent to a consequent variable indicates 
that the antecedent variable accounts for significant variance in the consequent variable, 
after controlling for all of the other antecedent variables connected to that consequent 
variable.  
 
A model was specified including the following sequentially ordered measures: 1) Phase 1 
prediction; 2) Phase 1 performance; 3) Phase 2 prediction; 4) Phase 2 intention 
offloading behavior; 5) Phase 2 performance. For simplicity, the two postdiction 
measures were not included (Table 2 already shows that the postdiction measures were in 
every case significantly correlated with the relevant objective measure). Paths were 
included linking each measure to all of its antecedent measures. This yielded a total of 10 
paths, labeled A-J. Figure 2 shows the results of these analyses; the path weights are 
discussed in turn below. Note that every significant path weight was either replicated in 
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the two independent experiments, significant after Bonferroni correction for 20 paths 
(10 paths x 2 experiments), or both. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Path A shows that participants were able to predict their forthcoming phase 1 
performance in Experiment 1b but not Experiment 1a. Path B indicates that in both 
experiments phase 1 predictions were correlated with subsequent phase 2 predictions, 
perhaps reflecting 1) individual participants’ tendency to use a restricted part of the 
response scale; 2) their general confidence; 3) their general motivation to perform well in 
the task, or a combination of these factors. Path C indicates that in Experiment 1b 
participants updated their performance predictions from phases 1 to 2 on the basis of 
objective phase 1 performance, but this was not the case in Experiment 1a. Path D 
indicates that participants’ metacognitive judgment of their unaided ability to perform 
the task was negatively related to their use of an intention offloading strategy in phase 2. 
In other words, participants who predicted their unaided ability to be relatively poor were 
more likely to offload intentions when they could. Path E indicates that participants’ 
objective performance in phase 1 was negatively related to intention offloading in phase 
2, even after controlling for the influence of their prospective metacognitive 
performance predictions. Thus, the experience of making errors in the unaided phase of 
the task may have triggered an increase in phase 2 intention offloading, and / or 
participants with lower cognitive ability, reflected in their phase 1 performance, may have 
learned to utilize cognitive strategies more often even without metacognitive awareness 
of this. Path F indicates that in Experiment 1b, participants’ predictions of phase 2 
accuracy when intention offloading was available predicted their actual use of an 
intention offloading strategy, even after controlling for their predicted unaided ability. 
	   16	  
There was no such relationship in Experiment 1a. Path G indicates that accuracy in 
phase 1 predicted accuracy in phase 2, perhaps reflecting cognitive factors that could 
influence accuracy both with and without the opportunity to offload intentions, and / or 
motivation to perform well in the experiment. Path H showed that in both studies, 
intention offloading was effective in boosting performance. Finally, paths I and J showed 
that the phase 1 and 2 predictions did not account for any additional variance in phase 2 
performance, after controlling for other antecedent variables. For the three paths that 
were significant in Experiment 1b but not 1a (paths A, C, and F), weights were 
significantly different between the two experiments (p < .02; Paternoster, Brame, 
Mazerolle, & Piquero, 1998). None of the other path weights differed significantly 
between the experiments. 
 
In a final analysis, stepwise regression was conducted to evaluate the additional variance 
in Phase 2 performance that could be explained by intention offloading, after first 
controlling for unaided ability represented by Phase 1 performance. A model of Phase 2 
performance including just Phase 1 performance as a regressor yielded an adjusted r2 of 
0.31 in Experiment 1a and 0.36 in Experiment 1b. This rose to 0.36 and 0.52 respectively 
when externalizing proportion was included as an additional regressor. Thus, the model 
including both regressors accounted for over a third of the variance in Experiment 1a’s 
Phase 2 performance, and over half in Experiment 1b. Of this variance, 12% was 
uniquely attributable to intention offloading in Experiment 1a, and 30% in Experiment 
1b. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
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Metacognitive judgments of unaided ability, along with objective measures of actual 
unaided performance, independently predicted the use of intention offloading. Both of 
these relationships were negative, indicating that participants offload intentions in a 
compensatory manner, i.e. when they believe their unaided ability to be relatively poor 
and, independently, when their unaided ability objectively is relatively poor. Strikingly, in 
Experiment 1a performance predictions were uncorrelated with objective performance 
measures, but both subjective and objective measures predicted intention offloading. 
Furthermore, intention offloading facilitated task performance: when this strategy was 
available, its increased use led to better performance. 
 
While the two experiments were consistent in showing that intention offloading was 
independently predicted by subjective confidence and objective ability, as well as 
showing that intention offloading boosted performance, there also appeared to be 
divergence between the experiments. In particular, Experiment 1b revealed that A) phase 
1 predictions significantly predicted objective phase 1 performance; B) phase 2 
predictions were significantly updated as a result of objective phase 1 performance; and 
C) phase 2 predictions significantly predicted phase 2 intention offloading. None of these 
effects was significant in Experiment 1a. A possible explanation of this discrepancy 
would be that the task in Experiment 1a was extremely simple: participants were only 
required to remember a single intention, and they were not interrupted when they did so. 
Accuracy was high in this task (93%). Under such conditions, participants may lack the 
metacognitive insight to predict rare errors in the task. Furthermore, individual 
differences in general motivation to perform well might not translate reliably into 
objective performance differences, seeing as the task was so simple, and participants’ 
intention to use an offloading strategy may not have strongly influenced their predictions 
of how well they would do at the task. In this case, any relationship between 
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performance predictions and objective measures of behavior would be expected to be 
reduced or absent. 
 
3. Experiment 2 
 
Results of Experiment 1 showed that intention offloading was predicted by participants’ 
confidence in their ability to perform a matched task in which reminders were not 
permitted. However, the question remains whether strategy use is also influenced by 
domain-general metacognitive confidence, i.e. a belief in one’s ability to effectively carry 
out diverse tasks, regardless of the specific domain. This might reflect a general factor 
relating to beliefs about one’s abilities, much as the hypothesized ‘g’ factor of general 
intelligence relates to performance of diverse tasks (Carroll, 2003; Spearman, 1904). 
 
In order to investigate this question, participants in Experiment 2 performed the same 
tasks and provided the same metacognitive judgments as Experiment 1. They also 
performed a pair of perceptual discrimination tasks that were entirely unrelated to the 
delayed intention task. On each trial, participants made a difficult perceptual judgment, 
using a staircase procedure to maintain accuracy at about 70%. They also provided a 
metacognitive evaluation on each trial of how confident they were that they had made 
the correct judgment.  Two relevant measures can be derived from these evaluations. A 
measure of metacognitive confidence can be derived from the mean confidence rating 
across trials. This reflects each participant’s bias towards higher or lower confidence, 
even though objective performance was fixed at around 70% by the staircase procedure. 
Additionally, a measure of metacognitive sensitivity can be derived by evaluating the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy on a trial-by-trial basis, i.e. how reliably 
accuracy varies with confidence. This reflects how well participants can discriminate 
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between correct responses and guesses. A similar approach was used by Song et al. 
(2011), who also administered a pair of perceptual tasks, using a staircase procedure and 
with a confidence judgment after each trail. Song et al. (2011) found that both 
confidence and sensitivity were correlated across the two perceptual tasks, suggesting the 
existence of common metacognitive processes operating across different perceptual 
decisions. However, confidence and sensitivity were not correlated with each other. They 
also suggested that confidence ratings partly reflect a task-independent component of 
general confidence, and partly a task-specific component. The present study aims to 
replicate these findings in a web-based task. It also goes further by investigating 1) 
whether any putative domain-general confidence signal correlates not only across 
perceptual tasks, but also relates to confidence in the quite different domain of the 
intention offloading task; and 2) whether domain-general confidence relates to strategic 
offloading of intentions. 
 
3.1 Methods 
 
3.1.1 Procedure 
 
The experiment took place in two parts. One part was identical to Experiment 1b, with 
three targets and interruption from an arithmetic question on each intention offloading 
trial (this was because there was more variability in performance with this version of the 
task). As in Experiment 1b, participants performed the task in two phases, the first phase 
disallowing intention offloading and the second phase permitting it, with pre- and post-
dictions before and after each phase. The other part of Experiment 2 consisted of a pair 
of perceptual discrimination tasks. Participants were randomly allocated to perform the 
intention offloading tasks before the perceptual tasks, or vice versa. 
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[Figure 3 about here] 
 
There were two perceptual tasks. In each task, participants viewed a fixation point with a 
pair of grids to its left and right, each formed of 20 horizontal and 20 vertical pale green 
lines, to yield a total of 400 internal squares (Figure 3). In the Number task, a randomly 
selected 200 squares on one side (i.e. 50%) were filled in a pink colour; on the other side 
more than 200 were filled. Participants were asked to judge which side had more filled 
squares. The starting difficulty for this task was set so that 300 squares were filled on one 
side; in order to increase difficulty this could be gradually reduced so that the side with 
more filled squares approached 200. In the Contrast task, every square was filled a 
different shade of gray. Participants were asked to judge on which side the contrast 
between the different shades was greater. The starting difficulty for this task was set so 
that the shades on one side varied from 15% maximum brightness to 85% and the other 
from 35% to 65%. The difference between the sides could be gradually reduced to 
approach 25% to 75% on both sides. In this task, the brightness of the 400 squares was 
uniformly spaced from the brightest to the darkest, with each shade placed in a random 
position within the grid. For a demonstration of the perceptual tasks, please visit 
“http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sam-gilbert/demos/staircaseDemo.html”. 
 
In order to train participants on each task, they first viewed an example stimulus with 
minimum difficulty, which remained on screen until they made a response. If their 
response was incorrect, another example stimulus was presented. Once they had made a 
correct response, they were presented with five more trials, with each stimulus presented 
for 800ms. If they made any mistakes on these five trials, five more were presented. Next 
they were presented with five trials with each stimulus presented for 250ms, requiring at 
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least four correct responses to continue. After this point, 80 practice trials were 
presented. From this point onwards, difficulty was adjusted with a “two-down one-up” 
staircase procedure, so that difficulty was increased one step after two consecutive 
correct responses and decreased one step after any incorrect response. This has the effect 
of stabilising accuracy at a level of approximately 70.7% (Levitt, 1971). After these 
practice trials, the instructions for metacognitive judgements were presented as follows: 
“After each trial we would like you to indicate how confident you are that you responded 
correctly. Please answer on a scale of 1-4, where 1 would indicate that you were purely 
guessing, and 4 would indicate that you were confident you got the right answer.” 
Participants were also instructed: “You must use the full extent of the scale, so that you 
use every answer from 1-4 at least sometimes. Please remember that this scale indicates 
relative confidence, and you will rarely be absolutely certain that you were correct. So 
even if you select 4, you may still have some doubt”. Following each trial, participants 
used the same response keys as they used for the perceptual judgements to move an 
arrow between the four confidence options, with 1 labelled “guessing” and 4 labelled 
“confident”. They pressed the ‘m’ key to submit this judgement. The final timings for 
each trial were as follows: 1) unfilled grids for 400ms; 2) stimulus presentation for 
250ms; 3) unfilled grids until a response was made; 4) confidence response until the ‘m’ 
key was pressed; 5) 500ms delay. Participants performed a further 10 practice trials with 
the confidence judgements. They then performed two experimental blocks of 75 trials. 
After completing the experimental trials, the other perceptual task (Number or Contrast) 
was then administered in an identical manner. Ordering of the two perceptual tasks was 
counterbalanced between participants. After each of these tasks, participants gave a 
‘postdiction’ judgement of what percentage of trials they thought they had answered 
correctly in that task, using a slider in an identical manner as in the pre- and post-dictions 
given in the intention offloading task.  
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3.1.2 Data analysis 
 
Measures from the intention offloading task were extracted in an identical manner to 
Experiment 1. Additional measures were extracted from each of the perceptual tasks as 
follows. 1) Mean accuracy provides a measure of task performance, calculated as the 
percentage of correct responses. 2) Metacognitive sensitivity indexes the strength of the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy on each trial. It was calculated using the 
type II receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Fleming & Lau, 2014). This is the 
same measure as was used in the related study by Song et al. (2011; see p. 1789 for 
further details). It is calculated by constructing a ROC curve reflecting the cumulative 
probability of being correct for each level of confidence. The area under this curve 
provides a robust estimate of metacognitive sensitivity, independent of response bias 
(Kornbrot, 2006). 3) Metacognitive confidence reflects each participant’s bias towards 
higher or lower confidence; it is calculated simply as the mean confidence level across 
trials. 4) Metacognitive postdiction provides an additional measure of confidence, from the 
single rating given by participants at the end of each task reflecting what proportion of 
trials they thought they had answered correctly. 
 
3.1.3 Participants 
 
317 participants were recruited (mean age: 32; range: 18-68; 146 male) from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Participation in the experiment took approximately 40 minutes, for 
which participants were paid $4. 
 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
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In order to ensure reliable data, any participant scoring below 80% on the arithmetic 
verification task or below 50% (i.e. below chance) on either of the perceptual 
discrimination tasks was discarded. This led to the removal of 9 participants (2.8%). 
Furthermore, inspection of the data from the perceptual tasks showed that a small 
number of participants performed close to chance, suggesting a failure of the staircase 
procedure and/or frequent guessing or random responses. Thus, any participant with 
accuracy outside 3 standard deviations of the group mean for either task was additionally 
discarded, leading to the removal of a further 5 (1.6%) participants. The final sample 
therefore consisted of 303 participants.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Performance measures are given in Table 3. Results from the intention offloading task 
were similar to those obtained in Experiment 1b (phase 1 accuracy: mean = .81, SD = 
.17; phase 2 accuracy: mean = .87, SD = .16; phase 2 externalizing proportion: mean = 
.66, SD = .47). Accuracy was around 71% in the perceptual tasks, suggesting that the 
staircase procedure was effective at avoiding floor and ceiling effects, at least for the 
participants included in the final sample. Accuracy was slightly higher in the Number task 
than the Contrast task (t(302) = 3.9, p = .0001); however, both the accuracy postdiction 
(t(302) = 2.5, p = .01) and the mean confidence rating (t(302) = 6.0, p < 10-8) were 
higher for the Contrast task than the Number task. Thus, the small difference in mean 
accuracy between the two tasks was not reflected in the confidence ratings. 
Metacognitive sensitivity did not differ between the tasks (t(302) = 1.4, p = .18). 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
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Mean accuracy levels for each confidence rating are shown in Figure 4; this figure also 
shows that the difficulty level in each task had plateaued by the time of the experimental 
trials as a result of the staircase procedure. Table 4 shows a correlation matrix between 
the measures of accuracy, sensitivity, confidence, and postdiction, separately for each 
task (see Methods for definition). Every measure correlated significantly with the 
analogous measure in the other task. Furthermore, the two types of confidence measure 
(mean confidence from the trial-by-trial ratings, and the single postdiction of accuracy at 
the end of each task) were also significantly intercorrelated. However, none of the 
correlations across different types of measure was significant. These results replicate the 
findings of Song et al. (2011), who showed that 1) measures of metacognitive sensitivity 
were significantly correlated across tasks, 2) measures of metacognitive confidence were 
significantly correlated across tasks, and 3) measures of sensitivity and confidence were 
uncorrelated with each other. However, unlike the findings of Song et al. (2011), the 
measures of accuracy were also significantly correlated across tasks in the present study. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the measures derived from the 
perceptual tasks and those derived from the intention offloading task, first the measures 
of accuracy, sensitivity, confidence, and postdiction were collapsed over the Number and 
Contrast tasks. The correlations between these measures and those derived from the 
intention-offloading task were then calculated (Table 5). 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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Correlations between the intention offloading measures were qualitatively similar to 
those obtained in Experiment 1b, i.e. significant correlations from Experiment 1b were 
replicated and nonsignificant correlations remained nonsignificant. There were five 
exceptions to this: the correlation between phase 1 prediction and phase 2 performance 
and the correlation between the measure of externalizing proportion and the four 
pre/post-dictions. In each of these cases, results were qualitatively similar to Experiment 
1a rather than Experiment 1b. It was suggested above that path analysis may be a more 
appropriate approach for investigating results from the present paradigm. Thus, a path 
analysis analogous to the one shown in Figure 2 was conducted. This showed that every 
significant path from Experiment 1b remained at least marginally significant in the 
present dataset (t (302) > 1.68, p < .094). Thus, there was good consistency of results 
across experiments. 
 
Turning now to the relationship between measures from the perceptual tasks and those 
from the intention-offloading task, results were as follows. The measure of metacognitive 
sensitivity did not correlate with any other measure, even though this measure was 
significantly correlated across the two perceptual tasks, demonstrating its reliability. 
Likewise, the perceptual accuracy measure was uncorrelated with all other measures. 
However, the perceptual confidence and postdiction measures were positively correlated 
with phase 1 prediction in the intention-offloading task, and negatively correlated with 
the externalizing proportion, i.e. propensity to set reminders. Thus, participants with 
higher confidence in their perceptual judgements also tended to predict better 
performance in phase 1 of the intention offloading task, as well as setting fewer 
reminders when they were permitted to do so (Figure 5). This occurred even though 
perceptual confidence was unrelated to any objective measure of performance, and even 
though the perceptual and intention offloading tasks were unrelated to each other. In 
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other words, results suggested a contribution of domain-general confidence to both the 
perceptual and delayed intention tasks, which was related to the propensity to set 
reminders. Higher perceptual confidence was not related to objective performance, but it 
was related to strategic use of reminders in an unrelated task. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
In order to evaluate whether task-specific confidence was also related to the use of 
reminders, along with the domain-general effect demonstrated above, a multiple 
regression was conducted to predict externalizing proportion from both the phase 1 
prediction (i.e. prediction of unaided memory ability) and perceptual confidence. The 
perceptual confidence measure was generated by transforming the mean confidence and 
postdiction measures into Z scores and then collapsing across them. In the regression 
model, the perceptual confidence measure was not significant (standardised beta = -.08, 
t(302) = 1.37, p = .17), but significant additional variance was explained by the memory 
confidence measure (standardised beta = -.19, t(302) = 3.2, p = .001). Results were 
similar when using the mean confidence or postdiction measures alone, rather than the 
combined perceptual confidence measures. Thus, propensity to set reminders was 
influenced both by domain-general confidence (shown by the correlation between 
perceptual confidence and externalizing proportion in the intention offloading task) and 
a task-specific effect (shown by the additional predictive validity conferred by the 
memory confidence measure). 
 
Seeing as the order of the perceptual and intention-offloading tasks was counterbalanced 
between participants, it might be predicted that participants performing the perceptual 
tasks first would show a stronger relationship between their perceptual confidence 
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ratings and subsequent offloading behaviour than participants performing the tasks in 
the reverse order. There was some limited support for this hypothesis. For participants 
performing the perceptual tasks first, the correlation between the collapsed perceptual 
confidence measure and propensity to set reminders in the intention-offloading task was 
-.21 (p = .009). For participants performing the tasks in the reverse order, this correlation 
was -.09 (p = .29). However, the difference between these correlation coefficients was 
not significant (p = .28). 
 
4. General Discussion 
 
The present study investigated individual differences in ‘intention offloading’, i.e. the 
process of setting up external reminders for delayed intentions. Intention offloading was 
effective: participants who set more reminders fulfilled more intentions. Furthermore, 
individual differences in offloading behaviour explained significant variance in intention 
fulfilment, even after controlling for unaided ability. Promoting the use of external 
artifacts may therefore be an effective means for improving real-world prospective 
memory, one that is likely to be more amenable to behaviour-change interventions than 
interventions targeted at individuals’ unaided ability. 
 
Intention offloading was predicted by 1) low metacognitive predictions of unaided ability 
and 2) objectively poor unaided ability. These influences were independent of one 
another, and occurred even in Experiment 1a, where subjective confidence was unrelated 
to objective accuracy. In addition, Experiment 2 showed that confidence in an unrelated 
perceptual task also predicted intention offloading in the delayed intention task, 
indicating a contribution of domain-general metacognitive confidence. Thus, results 
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indicate that strategic use of reminders is influenced by multiple metacognitive 
confidence signals, and, independently, objective ability. 
 
4.1 Metacognition and prospective memory 
 
Previous studies investigating the relationship between metacognition and prospective 
memory have reported three main findings. First, participants generally have modest but 
significant metacognitive insight into their prospective memory performance. Second, 
participants tend to be underconfident about their performance (Meeks et al., 2007; 
Schnitzspahn et al., 2011). Results of the present study are consistent with both of these 
findings. Third, participants’ metacognitive beliefs influence prospective memory 
strategies, for example the allocation of attention towards the prospective memory task 
versus the ongoing task in which it is embedded (Rummel & Meiser, 2013). The present 
study extends this finding, by showing that metacognitive judgments, in addition, 
influence propensity to use strategies involving external reminders. 
 
4.2 Intention offloading and metacognitive confidence 
 
The three experiments reported here were consistent in showing an effect of 
metacognitive confidence on intention offloading behaviour. This suggests that lowering 
participants’ confidence might increase the use of offloading strategies, even without 
improving their insight into their unaided ability. Interestingly, in a study by Knight et al. 
(2005), participants with traumatic brain injury made overconfident predictions of their 
prospective memory ability, whereas control participants were underconfident. This 
suggests that in the context of ageing or rehabilitation, it could be more helpful to target 
overconfidence than unaided ability in order to promote the fulfilment of delayed 
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intentions. Furthermore, the influence of domain-general confidence on intention 
offloading in Experiment 2 suggests that a single intervention that has the effect of 
reducing confidence might influence strategic behaviour across diverse domains. 
 
4.3 Intention offloading and objective ability 
 
There are several possible explanations of the relationship between objective unaided 
accuracy and intention offloading, independent of metacognitive confidence. First, 
participants with poor unaided ability may have learned the benefit of intention 
offloading to a greater extent than those with better ability, even without metacognitive 
awareness of this. Second, participants’ experience of making errors in the unaided first 
phase of the delayed intention task may have prompted subsequent use of intention 
offloading, independent of their prior predicted ability. This would suggest an additional 
contribution of a metacognitive process of online performance monitoring, as well as 
prior metacognitive confidence. Third, participants with poor unaided ability may have 
perceived the task as more difficult, and hence requiring the use of compensatory 
strategies, even without insight into their level of ability. Of course, these possibilities are 
not mutually exclusive.   
  
4.4 Domain-specificity of metacognition 
 
On a theoretical level, the present results are relevant to the delineation of domain-
general and task-specific metacognitive processes, and their relation to strategic 
behaviour. Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Song et al. (2011) that both 
metacognitive sensitivity and metacognitive confidence contain a domain-general 
component that operates across diverse perceptual tasks, although the two measures 
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seem independent of one another. This is consistent with the suggestion made by de 
Gardelle and Mamassian (2014) of a common metacognitive ‘currency’ across perceptual 
tasks. Furthermore, Experiment 2 showed that metacognitive confidence can be 
generalized not only across perceptual tasks but also into the mnemonic domain, and 
that this signal relates functionally to strategic behaviour. In related studies, both Baird et 
al. (2013) and McCurdy et al. (2013) showed a correlation between metacognitive 
confidence in perceptual and mnemonic tasks, consistent with a domain-general 
confidence signal. This suggests the existence of a ‘g’ factor of metacognitive confidence, 
that operates across diverse domains. 
 
Turning now to metacognitive sensitivity, i.e. the ability to discriminate correct responses 
from guesses on a trial-by-trial basis, Baird et al. (2013) found no correlation between 
perceptual and mnemonic tasks (though see McCurdy et al., 2013, for a different result), 
and Fleming et al. (2014) provided neuropsychological evidence for a dissociation 
between sensitivity in the two domains. In the present study, although metacognitive 
sensitivity generalised across the two perceptual tasks, it was unrelated to any measure 
from the delayed intention task.  These results suggest that metacognitive sensitivity is 
less likely to generalise across domains than metacognitive confidence. It also suggests 
that metacognitive confidence, rather than metacognitive sensitivity, may be more likely 
to influence strategic behaviour. 
 
4.5 Web-based data collection 
 
The use of online web-based experiments, rather than traditional laboratory-based 
studies presents both advantages and disadvantages. The chief advantage is that it is an 
effective means for the collection of large volumes of data. This helps to mitigate against 
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the chief disadvantage, which is the reduction in experimental control over participant 
behaviour and the precise experimental parameters (e.g. due to the use of different 
computer systems from one participant to the next). Although measurements derived 
from web-based experiments will likely be noisier than those derived from laboratory 
studies, sensitivity to experimentally-induced effects can be greater due to larger samples 
(often orders of magnitude larger than those that are practical with more traditional 
approaches). Furthermore, the participant pool is likely to be more representative of the 
general population than the undergraduate convenience samples typical in behavioural 
studies, albeit not perfectly representative (Mason & Suri, 2012). Another advantage of 
web-based experiments is that they provide a relatively simple means of following up 
participants after the experimental session via further online testing. For example, Gilbert 
(in press) showed that performance of the present intention-offloading task was 
correlated with successful fulfilment of a naturalistic intention: visiting a specified web 
link up to one week after the experimental session. Thus, the experimental paradigm has 
significant external validity with respect to participants’ fulfilment of real-world 
intentions embedded in their everyday routines, over periods of up to one week.  
Nevertheless, understanding the generalizability of the effects reported in the present 
study would benefit from the enhanced experimental control made possible by testing 
participants in a laboratory setting. It would also benefit from examination of the ways in 
which participants use external reminders to support memory for intentions delayed over 
periods of hours, days, and weeks. In everyday life, we use external artefacts to remind us 
of intentions delayed by periods of seconds (e.g. physically holding a task-relevant item 
to cue an intended behaviour after a brief interruption in a nursing setting; Grundgeiger, 
Sanderson, MacDougall, & Venkatesh, 2010) as well as over longer periods (e.g. creating 
a diary entry for a planned hospital appointment). However, it is unclear how far the 
processes involved in setting external reminders for intentions delayed by a few seconds, 
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as in the present study, overlap with those involved in long-term intentions. Indeed, it is 
debatable whether “prospective memory” (as opposed to e.g. “working memory”) is the 
best label to describe the present paradigm, given the brief retention interval (see Gilbert, 
in press, for further discussion of this point). Thus, an important question for further 
research is the extent to which similar mechanisms play a role in the use of reminders for 
intentions delayed over different timescales. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Due to technological advances such as time-, location-, and person-based smartphone 
reminders and wearable devices, our ability to fulfil delayed intentions may increasingly 
be supported by external artefacts. The present results indicate that an individual’s choice 
to use such external artefacts may be based on diverse metacognitive processes, alongside 
an influence of objected unaided ability. In particular, the present results highlight the 
importance of both domain-general and task-specific metacognitive confidence signals, 
suggesting that such signals could be important targets for therapeutic interventions to 
improve individuals’ ability to fulfil delayed intentions. Understanding the contribution 
of these factors, and the ways in which they interact, will help to ensure that such 
artefacts are designed efficiently and used effectively, in order to promote behavioural 
independence. 
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Table 1. Experiment 1 performance measures. 
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Table 2. Correlations between metacognitive and objective measures. Shaded cells: 
Experiment 1a; White cells: Experiment 1b. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 3. Performance measures from the perceptual tasks in Experiment 2. 
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Table 4. Correlations between measures from the perceptual tasks in Experiment 2. 
* p < .05; *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Correlations between perceptual and intention offloading measures in 
Experiment 2. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the intention offloading task. 
 
Figure 2. Path analysis model of the relationships between measures collected in 
Experiments 1a and 1b. Significant paths in both experiments are shown in black. 
Significant paths in Experiment 1b only are shown in red (note: these path weights were 
significantly different between the two experiments). Nonsignificant paths in both 
experiments are shown in gray. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic illustration of the perceptual tasks. Note: each trial was preceded by 
an unfilled grid for 400ms (not shown). 
 
Figure 4. A: Difficulty level in the perceptual tasks. Lower numbers indicate that the 
stimuli were more similar, hence a more difficult discrimination. Green shading indicates 
standard error of the mean. Results indicate that difficulty had plateaued by the time that 
experimental trials begin, with a slight reduction in difficulty before onset of 
experimental trials in the contrast task, potentially due to the additional demands of the 
metacognitive judgment. B: Accuracy in the two tasks, for the four confidence levels. 
Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between confidence in perceptual judgments and propensity to set 
reminders in the intention-offloading task. Participants were ranked in perceptual 
confidence by converting mean perceptual confidence and mean perceptual postdiction 
judgments into Z scores, then collapsing across these measures. Individuals were then 
allocated to five quintiles, from lowest to highest confidence, and the mean externalizing 
proportion in the intention-offloading task (i.e. propensity to set reminders) was 
calculated for each quintile. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
 
 
 
 
